## Our Investment Outlook and Three Stock Ideas

## Boys \& Girls Harbor Investment Conference <br> February 3, 2010

T2 Accredited Fund, LP Tilson Offshore Fund, Ltd.<br>T2 Oualified Fund, LP

## T2 Partners LLC

This presentation is posted at: www.tilsonfunds.com/Harbor.pdf

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## T2 Partners LLC

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## Household Liabilities as a Percentage of Disposable Income Remains Very High



Notes: Includes nonprofit organizations; 2009 figure is for the second quarter

## High Federal Government Deficits Stretch As Far As the Eye Can See

## Deficit Forecasts



## Over the Past 30 Years, We Have Become a Nation Gorged in Debt - To The Benefit of Financial Services Firms



# We Think We're Likely in the Midst of a Secular Bear Market - And With Interest Rates Low and P/E Multiples High, It's Hard to See How a Sustained Bull Market Could Occur 

## Interest Rates on Long-Term Govt. Bonds



Note: Olert is logarithrik, with wartical scale comprossed to shour charges in porcontage twrme. A rise from 100 to 110 talas the same space as arise from 10000 to 11000 , since both are 100 changes.

## Based on Inflation-Adjusted 10-Year Trailing Earnings, the S\&P 500 at 20.8x Is Trading Above Its 130-Year Average of 16.3x



## Berkshire Hathaway

## T2 Partners LLC



|  |  | Pre-tax EPS |  | Subsequent |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Excluding All |  |  |
|  | Investments | Income From | Intrinsic Value | Year Stock |
| Year End | Per Share | Investments ${ }^{1}$ | Per Share | Price Range |
| 2001 | \$47,460 | -\$1,289 | \$64,000 | \$59,600-\$78,500 |
| 2002 | \$52,507 | \$1,479 | \$70,000 | \$60,600-\$84,700 |
| 2003 | \$62,273 | \$2,912 | \$97,000 | \$81,000-\$95,700 |
| 2004 | \$66,967 | \$3,003 | \$103,000 | \$78,800-\$92,000 |
| 2005 | \$74,129 | \$3,600 | \$117,300 | \$85,700-\$114,200 |
| 2006 | \$80,636 | \$5,200-\$5,400 ${ }^{2}$ | \$143,000-\$144,400 | \$107,200-\$151,650 |
| 2007 | \$90,343 | \$5,500-\$5,700 ${ }^{3}$ | \$156,300-\$158,700 | \$84,000-\$147,000 |
| 2008 | \$77,793 | \$5,728 | , \$123,617 (8 multiple) | \$70,050-\$108,100 |
| 2009 (est.) | \$92,500 | \$5,000 ${ }^{4}$ | \$142,500 (10 multiple) | ? |

Given compressed multiples at the end of 2008, we used an 8 rather than a 12 multiple.
We bumped this to a 10 multiple at the end of 2009, still below the 12 multiple we believe Buffett uses.

1. Unlike Buffett, we include earnings from Berkshire"s insurance businesses.
2. Actual result was $\$ 6,492$, but we reduce this to assume the $2^{\text {nd }}$-worst year ever for super-cat losses.
3. Actual result was $\$ 6,270$ but we reduce the pre-tax, pre-investment-income margins of the insurance businesses by 400 basis points (from 14\% to 10\%) to reflect Buffett's guidance in the Annual Report.
4. We have trimmed our estimate of normalized earnings to reflect the weak economy.

## Even Using an 10 Multiple, Berkshire Is Approximately 20\% Below Intrinsic Value



[^0]
## 12-Month Investment Return

- Current intrinsic value: $\$ 142,500 /$ share
- Plus $5 \%$ growth of intrinsic value of the business
- Plus cash build over next 12 months: $\$ 4,000 /$ share
- Equals intrinsic value in one year of $\$ 153,600$
- $36 \%$ above today"s price


## General Growth Properties

## General Growth Properties - Overview

## Premier Mall-based Domestic REIT

- Over 200 regional high-quality malls
- Diverse footprint and tenant base
- One of only two mall REITs with national footprint (along with SPG)


## Attraction of Business

- Long-term tenant leases
- Stable cash flows
- Embedded growth


## Bankruptcy

- Company could not roll debt due to shut down of credit markets
- Liquidity problem, not solvency problem (filed in April 2009)

Opportunity

- Emergence from bankruptcy and/or minority investment or sale
- NYSE listing (opening up for fund, indices)


## General Growth Properties' Stock Has Been on a Wild Ride Over the Past Two Years




## General Growth Properties' TTM NOI: \$2.478 Billion

|  | $\mathbf{4 0 8}$ |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Minimum rent | $\$ 639$ |  |  |
| Tenant recoveries | 273 |  |  |
| Overage rents | 38 |  |  |
| Other | $\underline{52}$ |  |  |
| Total Property Revenues | $(80)$ |  |  |
|  | $(68)$ |  |  |
| Less: Real estate taxes | $(15)$ |  |  |
| Less: Repairs \& maintenance | $(134)$ |  |  |
| Less: Marketing | $\underline{(4)}$ |  |  |
| Less: Other property operating costs | $\$ 702$ |  |  |
| Less: Provision for doubtful accounts | 6 |  |  |
| NOI | $(5)$ |  |  |
| Less: Straight-line rent adj. | 2 |  |  |
| Less: FAS 141 adj. (lease mark to mkt) | $\underline{1}$ |  |  |
| Plus: Non-cash ground rent expense | $\$ 706$ |  |  |

## Simon Properties' TTM NOI: $\$ 3.244$ Billion

|  | 4 Q 08 | 1009 | $\underline{2009}$ | 3 O 09 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Minimum rent | \$807 | \$746 | \$754 | \$754 |
| Overage rent | 63 | 21 | 26 | 33 |
| Tenant reimbursements | 393 | 345 | 345 | 356 |
| Other income | 92 | 68 | 56 | 57 |
| Less: Interest income | (15) | (9) | (9) | (10) |
| Less: Gains on land sales | (5) | (0) | (3) | (0) |
| Total Revenue | \$1,334 | \$1,171 | \$1,168 | \$1,191 |
| Less: Property operating | (172) | (161) | (168) | (180) |
| Less: Real estate taxes | (106) | (112) | (106) | (99) |
| Less: Repairs \& maintenance | (47) | (33) | (30) | (29) |
| Less: Advertising \& promotion | (42) | (24) | (25) | (29) |
| Less: Provision for credit losses | (10) | (17) | (9) | (0) |
| Less: Other | (41) | (35) | (40) | (36) |
| NOI | \$916 | \$789 | \$791 | \$817 |
| Less: Straight-line rent adj. | (9) | (11) | (7) | (8) |
| Less: FAS 141 adj. (lease mark to mkt) | (9) | (7) | (13) | (6) |
| Cash NOI | \$899 | \$772 | \$770 | \$803 |

## At Simon Properties' Cap Rate, GGP Would Be Triple Today's Price

| Simon Properties (closed at $\mathbf{\$ 7 4 . 4 7}$ on 2/2/10) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Debt | $\$ 20,530$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOI | $\$ 3,244$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cap Rate |  | $\mathbf{6 . 7 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 2 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 5 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 7 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 0 0 \%}$ |
| Enterprise Value | $\$ 48,059$ | $\$ 46,343$ | $\$ 44,745$ | $\$ 43,253$ | $\$ 41,858$ | $\$ 40,550$ | $\$ 39,321$ |
| Equity Value | $\$ 27,529$ | $\$ 25,813$ | $\$ 24,215$ | $\$ 22,723$ | $\$ 21,328$ | $\$ 20,020$ | $\$ 18,791$ |
| Share Value | $\mathbf{\$ 7 8 . 4 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 7 3 . 5 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 8 . 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 4 . 7 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 0 . 7 6}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 7 . 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 3 . 5 4}$ |

General Growth Properties (closed at \$9.50 on 2/2/10)
Net Debt

| $\$ 26,813$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\$ 2,478$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\mathbf{6 . 7 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 2 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 5 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 7 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 2 5 \%}$ |
|  | $\$ 36,711$ | $\$ 35,400$ | $\$ 34,179$ | $\$ 33,040$ | $\$ 31,974$ | $\$ 30,975$ | $\$ 30,036$ |
|  | $\$ 9,898$ | $\$ 8,587$ | $\$ 7,366$ | $\$ 6,227$ | $\$ 5,161$ | $\$ 4,162$ | $\$ 3,223$ |
| $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 9 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 6 . 8 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 3 . 0 2}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 9 . 4 6}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 6 . 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 3 . 0 1}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 0 . 0 7}$ |  |

## Iridium

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- Iridium is the world"s only communication provider with the ability to provide real-time voice and data communications over 100\% of the earth"s service by virtue of the company"s 66-satellite low-earth orbit (LEO) constellation. In addition, Iridium is one of the few satellite operators with the ability to provide effective voice, machine-to-machine (M2M), and high-speed data services.
- One of two major players in Global Satellite Communications industry
- Single subscriber device works worldwide
- Motorola spent $\$ 5$ billion launching satellites in late 1990 s
- Filed for bankruptcy in 1999 with only 50,000 customers due to too much debt and clunky phones that didn"t work inside buildings



## Iridium Serves Many Different Markets

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Commercial Voice and DataQ12009 Subscribers:219,0852008 Service Revenue:2008 Commercial Revenue Growth:$28 \%$ |  |  | Government 012009 Subs: 31,163 '08Service Rev: \$67.8M '08 Rev Growth: 17\% | Machine-to-Machine <br> Q1 2009 Subs: 77,613 <br> '08Service Rev: \$11.2M <br> '00 Rev Growth: 104\% |
| Maritime <br> Voice \& data communications in international waters exclusive - Sea Area A4 -Crew calling -Fisheries mgmt -High Speed Data -Long Range ID \& Track | Aviation <br> Voice \& data communications in the sky <br> -Flight following <br> - Cockpit <br> communications <br> - Air safety services | Land <br> Commercial voice subscribers <br> -Disaster <br> -Emergencylrescue operations <br> $\cdot$ In-Network calling <br> -Regional Pricing <br> -Quality Guarantee | Voice \& data communications in-theater <br> -Over-the-Horizon -Netted <br> -Blue Force Tracking <br> -Unattended Sensors | Low latency, global applications <br> -Hundreds of apps <br> Fleet management <br> -Container tracking <br> - Oil and Gas telemetry <br> - Oceanographic data <br> -Personal Locator Beacon |
|  |  |  |  |  |

## Iridium's Market Share Has Grown Rapidly

## Total MSS Market Share 2001 - $\$ 0.6$ billion



COVERAGE


Regional GEO-2

Regional LEO-48

Global LEO - 24

Total MSS Market Share 2008-\$1.3 billion


SERVICES 2008 REVs.

GEO-3+8 legacy Voice, Broadband \$635M

LEO - 66 + spares Voice, Low \& High Data \$321M

## Iridium Has Shown Extraordinary Growth in Subscribers

## Total Subscribers



## Iridium Has Shown Extraordinary Growth in Revenue and Operational EDITDA

Revenue


Operational EBITDA


In Q3 "09, revenue was down 4\% due to weak equipment sales, but Operational EBITDA rose $28 \%$ and net income grew $36 \%$ (excluding acquisition-related expenses). Guidance for Operational EBITDA is \$126-\$130M in $2009 \$ 145-\$ 155 \mathrm{M}$ and in 2010.

## Iridium's Stock Has Tumbled Since It Began Trading in September



## Iridium NEXT

- Current satellite constellation will need to be replaced starting in 2014
- Backwards compatible (existing customers will not need to replace equipment)
- Improved capacity and data rates
- Total cost: $\$ 2.7$ billion
- Satellites: $\$ 1.9$ billion
- Launch: \$0.6 billion
- Other: \$0.2 billion
- Funding
- Internally generated cash flow
- Debt
- Equity
- Revenue offsets (hosted payloads)


# Iridium's Cap Ex Requirements Will Rise to Fund Iridium Next, and Then Fall 

Iridium Capital Expenditures


Source: Company filings and Stifel Nicolaus estimates

## Iridium Should Be Able to Fund Iridium NEXT From Cash Flow, Hosted Payloads and Warrant Conversion



Source: Raymond James estimates.

Share price (2/2/10): Shares outstanding:
\$7 warrants
$\$ 11.50$ warrants
Market cap:
Less cash:
Enterprise value:

2010 EBITDA (E)
EV/EBITDA:
\$6.88
68.2 million
13.5 million
14.4 million
\$469 million
\$137 million
\$332 million
\$150
2.2x

## We Expect a 25-35\% IRR on This Investment for Many Years to Come

Stock Price Based on EV/EBITDA Multiples

| Multiple | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | 9 | $\$ 25.36$ | $\$ 31.20$ | $\$ 37.77$ |
|  | 9 | $\$ 29.05$ | $\$ 35.22$ | $\$ 42.10$ |
| $\mathbf{I R R}$ | $\$ 32.74$ | $\$ 39.25$ | $\$ 46.43$ |  |
| Multiple |  |  |  |  |
|  | 8 | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{24 \%}$ | $\underline{2017}$ |
|  | 9 | $29 \%$ | $\underline{2018}$ |  |
|  | 10 | $30 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $35 \%$ |
|  |  |  | $34 \%$ | $37 \%$ |

Appendix - Berkshire Hathaway

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## Recent Performance of Key Business Units

## Earnings Before Taxes and Minority Interests, By Year:

|  | $\underline{2004}$ | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Insurance Group: |  |  |  |  |  |
| GEICO | 970 | 1,221 | 1,314 | 1,113 | 916 |
| General Re | 3 | -334 | 523 | 555 | 342 |
| Berkshire Reinsurance Group | 417 | -1,069 | 1,658 | 1,427 | 1,324 |
| Berkshire H. Primary Group | 161 | 235 | 340 | 279 | 210 |
| Investment Income | 2,824 | 3,480 | 4,316 | 4,758 | 4,722 |
| Total Insurance Oper. Inc. | 4,375 | 3,533 | 8,151 | 8,132 | 7,514 |
| Non-Insurance Businesses: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finance and Financial products | 584 | 822 | 1,157 | 1,006 | 787 |
| Marmon |  |  |  |  | 733 |
| McLane Company | 228 | 217 | 229 | 232 | 276 |
| MidAmerican/Utilities/Energy | 237 | 523 | 1,476 | 1,774 | 2,963 |
| Shaw Industries | 466 | 485 | 594 | 436 | 205 |
| Other businesses | 1,787 | 1,921 | 2,703 | 3,279 | 2,809 |
| Total Non-Insur. Oper. Inc. | 3,302 | 3,968 | 6,159 | 6,727 | 7,773 |
| Total Operating Income | 7,677 | 7,501 | 31 | 85 | ,287 |

## Recent Performance of Key Business Units

## Earnings Before Taxes and Minority Interests, By Quarter:

|  | Q105 | $\underline{\mathrm{O} 25}$ | $\underline{0305}$ | O4 05 | O1 06 | Q2 06 | O3 06 | O406 | Q1 07 | Q2 07 | Q3 07 | Q4 07 | O1 08 | Q2 08 | O3 08 | O4 08 | Q1 09 | Q2 09 | 309 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Insurance Group: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GEICO | 312 | 358 | 237 | 314 | 311 | 288 | 407 | 308 | 295 | 325 | 335 | 158 | 186 | 298 | 246 | 186 | 148 | 111 | 200 |
| General Re | 19 | 43 | -389 | -7 | 71 | 106 | 177 | 169 | 30 | 230 | 157 | 138 | 42 | 102 | 54 | 144 | -16 | 276 | 186 |
| Berkshire Reinsurance Group | 143 | 140 | 1,635 | 283 | 94 | 137 | 735 | 692 | 553 | 356 | 183 | 335 | 29 | 79 | -166 | 1,382 | 203 | -291 | 167 |
| Berkshire H. Primary Group | 18 | 37 | -10 | 190 | 35 | 43 | 108 | 154 | 49 | 63 | 77 | 90 | 25 | 81 | -8 | 112 | 4 | 29 |  |
| Investment Income | 787 | 851 | 900 | 942 | 1,018 | 1,102 | 1,103 | 1,093 | 1,078 | 1,236 | 1,217 | 1,227 | 1,089 | 1,204 | 1,074 | 1,355 | 1,298 | 1,422 | 1,34 |
| Total Insurance Oper. Inc. | 1,279 | 1,429 | -897 | 1,722 | 1,529 | 1,676 | 2,530 | 2,416 | 2,005 | 2,210 | 1,969 | 1,948 | 1,371 | 1,764 | 1,200 | 3,179 | 1,637 | 1,547 | 1,908 |
| Non-Insurance Businesses: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finance and Financial products | 199 | 199 | 207 | 217 | 251 | 343 | 282 | 281 | 242 | 277 | 273 | 214 | 241 | 254 | 163 | 129 | 127 | 135 | 142 |
| Marmon |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 28 | 261 | 247 | 197 | 162 | 170 | 194 |
| McLane Company | 69 | 59 | 53 | 36 | 55 | 56 | 50 | 68 | 58 | 72 | 50 | 52 | 73 | 68 | 68 | 67 | 143 | 66 | 64 |
| MidAmerican/Utilities/Energy | 141 | 100 | 141 | 141 | 418 | 278 | 416 | 364 | 513 | 372 | 481 | 408 | 516 | 329 | 526 | 1,592 | 303 | 402 | 441 |
| Shaw Industries | 88 | 139 | 145 | 113 | 155 | 169 | 138 | 132 | 91 | 111 | 125 | 109 | 51 | 82 | 49 | 23 | 55 | 30 | 51 |
| Other businesses | 364 | 514 | 486 | 557 | 430 | 671 | 686 | 916 | 632 | 904 | 895 | 848 | 693 | 874 | 749 | 493 | 151 | 171 | 299 |
| Total Non-Insur. Oper. Inc. | 861 | 1,011 | 1,032 | 1,064 | 1,309 | 1,517 | 1,572 | 1,761 | 1,536 | 1,736 | 1,824 | 1,631 | 1,602 | 1,868 | 1,802 | 2,501 | 941 | 974 | 1,191 |
| Total Operating Income | 2,140 | 2,440 | 135 | 2,786 | 2,838 | 3,193 | 4,102 | 4,177 | 3,541 | 3,946 | 3,793 | 3,579 | 2,973 | 3,632 | 3,002 | 5,680 | 2,578 | 2.521 | 3,099 |

The Earnings of Berkshire's Operating Businesses Have Grown at a Very High Rate And Growth is Accelerating
$\left.\begin{array}{lclccc} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Per-Share } \\ \text { Year } \\ \text { Investments }\end{array} & & & \begin{array}{c}\text { CAGR }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Per-Share } \\ \text { Pre-Tax Earnings }\end{array}\end{array}\right)$ CAGR

Berkshire is becoming less of an investment company and more of an operating business.

EPS is pretax, net of minority interests and excludes profits of Berkshire"s insurance operations.

## Growth in Earnings of Berkshire's Operating Businesses Has Slowed as Buffett Has Allocated More Capital to Investments in Recent Years

| Company Name | Market Cap | \% Growth |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Rate* |
| Exxon Mobil | \$408,458 | 24 |
| Wal-Mart | \$219,741 | 10 |
| Procter \& Gamble | \$185,621 | 14 |
| Microsoft | \$184,672 | 18 |
| General Electric | \$177,404 |  |
| AT\&T | \$166,772 | 26 |
| Johnson \& Johnson | \$165,614 | 9 |
| Chevron | \$157,159 | 27 |
| Berkshire Hathaway | \$154,573 | 14 |
| Pfizer | \$120,024 | 6 |
| IBM | \$119,877 |  |
| Cisco Systems | \$104,162 | 13 |
| Coca-Cola | \$103,439 | 9 |
| Google | \$102,180 | n/a |
| Hewlett-Packard | \$94,981 | 22 |
| Oracle | \$92,799 | 19 |
| Verizon | \$90,782 | 3 |
| Genentech | \$88,371 | 48 |
| Pepsico | \$86,509 | 11 |
| Intel | \$85,488 | 11 |
| ConocoPhillips | \$83,009 | 28 |
| Apple | \$82,689 | 202 |
| Abbott Labs | \$79,007 | 9 |
| McDonald's | \$69,258 | 16 |
| Amgen | \$61,813 | 14 |
| Median |  | 14 |

## The Burlington Northern Acquisition Dwarfs Anything Before It


$\square$ Acquisitions $\boxtimes$ Net Stock Purchases

- He"s doing a good job - but the cash is coming in so fast!
- A high-class problem
- Markets have a way of presenting big opportunities on short notice
- Current chaos, junk bonds in 2002
- Buffett has reduced average maturity of bond portfolio so he can act quickly


# A Breakdown of Berkshire's Capital Commitments in 2008 

| Investment/Commitment | Amount (Bn) | Comment |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
| Mars/Wrigley | $\$ 6.5$ |  |
| Auction rate securities | $\$ 6.5$ | Q2 event; sold much in Q3 |
| Goldman Sachs | $\$ 5.0$ | Plus \$5B to exercise warrants |
| Constellation Energy stock | $\$ 5.7$ | Sold for a \$1.1B gain incl. |
| and preferred |  | breakup fee |
| Marmon | $\$ 4.5$ | The remaining 34.6\% not |
|  |  | owned by BRK will be |
|  | $\$ 3.3$ | purchased from 2011-14 |
| General stock purchases | $\$ 3.0$ | Full year; net of sales |
| Dow/Rohm \& Haas | $\$ 3.0$ | Plus \$3B to exercise warrants |
| General Electric | $\$ 2.4$ | Q2 event; sold much in Q3 |
| Fed. Home Loan Disc. Notes | $\$ 1.0$ | Iscar acquisition |
| Tungaloy | $\$ 0.8$ | Plus sharing agreement |
| Swiss Re unit | $\$ 0.4$ |  |
| ING reinsurance unit | $\$ 3.9$ |  |
| Other businesses purchased |  | GE warrants |
| TOTAL |  |  |

## Valuing Berkshire

"Over the years we've...attempt[ed] to increase our marketable investments in wonderful businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses in their entirety." - 1995 Annual Letter
"In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments, but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column." - 1997 Annual Letter

"In effect, the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs." - 1997 Annual Letter

# Buffett's Comments on Berkshire's Valuation Lead to an Implied Multiplier of Approximately 12 

| Year | Investments Per Share | Pre-tax EPS <br> Excluding All <br> Income From <br> Investments | Year-End <br> Stock <br> Price | Intrinsic Value | Implied Multiplier |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1996 | \$28,500 | \$421 | \$34,100 | \$34,100 | 13 |
| 1997 | \$38,043 | \$718 | \$46,000 | \$46,000 | 11 |
| 1998 | \$47,647 | \$474 | \$70,000 | \$54,000 | 13 |
| 1999 | \$47,339 | -\$458 | \$56,100 | \$60,000 |  |

- 1996 Annual Letter: "Today's price/value relationship is both much different from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more appropriate."
- 1997 Annual Letter: "Berkshire's intrinsic value grew at nearly the same pace as book value" (book +34.1\%)
- 1998 Annual Letter: "Though Berkshire's intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the $48.3 \%$ recorded for book value." (Assume a 15$20 \%$ increase in intrinsic value.)
- 1999 Annual Letter: "A repurchase of, say, 2\% of a company's shares at a 25\% discount from per-share intrinsic value...We will not repurchase shares unless we believe Berkshire stock is selling well below intrinsic value, conservatively calculated...Recently, when the A shares fell below $\$ 45,000$, we considered making repurchases."


## Appendix - Iridium

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## A Highly Attractive Business

- Growing market share in a growing industry
- Huge barriers to entry
- US Department of Defense is an anchor customer (22\% of revenues in Q2 „09)
- Very high and rapidly expanding margins
- New products and applications


## Subscriber Growth Has Been Driven by Commercial and Machine-to-Machine

2002-2008 Subscriber Growth by Segment


## Why Is Iridium Out of Favor?

- SPAC structure
- Many SPAC shareholders were just in it for the cash payout upon consummation of a deal and are now selling
- Many warrant owners are shorting the stock
- Iridium tried to mitigate technical issues:
- Retired 30.5 million $\$ 7$ warrants
- Issued 16 million new shares
- Repurchased15.9 million shares
- Large future funding requirement for Iridium NEXT
- Dismal record of early telecom satellite networks
- Prior bankruptcy


## Iridium Came Public Via a SPAC Transaction

- SPACs have very poor track records in general
- But Iridium was acquired by a SPAC (Special Purpose Acquisition Company) controlled by Greenhill, a top quality private equity sponsor
- The deal price was negotiated during the market meltdown last fall (deal was announced 9/23/08), then the price was reduced in April and warrant dilution was cut back in July


## Iridium's Operational EBITDA is Projected to Double in Only Three Years

Iridium Operational ${ }^{*}$ EBITDA


[^1]
## Drivers of Stock Price Appreciation

- Low current valuation multiple ( $40 \%$ discount to closest public comp, Inmarsat)
- Rapid growth in earnings
- Removal of legacy SPAC investors
- Warrant holders finish hedging (shorting the stock)
- Removal of uncertainty overhang related to future capital expenditures


[^0]:    * Investments per share plus $12 x$ pre-tax earnings per share (excluding all income from investments) for the
    prior year, except for YE 2008 (8 multiple) and YE 2009 (10 multiple).

[^1]:    Source: Raymond James estimates.

